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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The exact location of property boundaries is vitally important.  
Typically, a property boundary can be determined through the use of a 
credible land surveyor.  If the survey markers can be found, the boundary 
survey can be used for decades, even centuries.1  However, unlike non-
riparian land boundaries, riparian land is unique due to the ephemeral 
nature of the property boundaries that change on a daily basis.  As such, 
a body of law has developed to provide guidance.2  This analysis will 
                                                 
* Dennison A. Butler is a Staff Attorney with the State of Montana.  He 
has extensive experience in real estate law, and the unique issues that arise in connection 
with the management of State Land and navigable waterways.  He has worked with all 
aspects of real estate law including oil and gas work, title issues, commercial leasing, 
agriculture and grazing rights, and property transfers within Montana as well as 
internationally in Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Japan, and Vietnam.  
1.  E.g., a Boundary Stone from 12 A.D. set the boundary between 
water rights in China.  The Boundary Stone of Han Dynasty in Suma Bay, 
CHINADAILY.COM.CN, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/regional/2015-05/18/content_ 
2075 0795.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2016). 
2.  E.g., Roman law widely recognized riparian boundaries and the 
public’s right to the navigable waters.  THOMAS COLLETT SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES 
OF JUSTINIAN 158 (William Gardiner Hammond ed. & trans., 1876). 
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discuss the different bodies of law that have developed to address these 
ever changing boundaries in Montana 
 
II.  EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE 
 
 Concerning tidal waters in the original thirteen states, the United 
States Supreme Court held in Martin v. Waddel, that “[w]hen the 
revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves 
sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their 
navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use.”3  
As additional states were admitted into the Union, the federal 
government granted each sovereign state title to all submerged beds of 
navigable waters contained within their borders under the Equal Footing 
Doctrine.4  This was done to allow all states subsequently admitted to be 
on “equal footing” with the original thirteen states concerning tidal 
waters.5  The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently extended this principal to 
non-tidal waters up to the high water mark. 6   To reaffirm this idea, 
Congress enacted the Federal Submerged Lands Act of 1953.7  Once 
again confirming that the federal government vested in each state all 
“title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the 
boundaries of the respective States.”8 
 The ownership is reaffirmed by the precursor to Montana Code 
Annotated § 70-1-202 which declared in 1894 that “[t]he [S]tate is the 
owner of . . . all land below the water of a navigable lake or stream.”9  
Montana was admitted into the Union on November 8, 1889.  As of that 
date, the State of Montana is owner in fee simple of all submerged lands 
located under navigable waters within the borders of the State, subject to 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.10 
 Prior to statehood, the federal government only claimed 
ownership of waterways used and regulated for commerce, or 
                                                 
3.  Martin v. Waddel, 41 U.S. 367, 367 (1842). 
4. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 231 (1845). 
5.  Id. at 216. 
6. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 325 (1877); see also State v. 
Mogen, 993 P.2d 699 (Mont. 2000) (holding the high water mark is the absence of 
vegetation). 
7. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012). 
8.  Id.  
9.  CODES AND STAT. OF MONT., tit. II, § 1091 (1895).  
10.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; United States v. Holt State Bank, 
270 U.S. 49, 54 (1926). 
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“navigable” waterways.11  As such, the State of Montana did not obtain 
title from the federal government for waterways that were non-
navigable.12  For non-navigable waterways, Montana Code Annotated § 
70-16-201 and § 70-20-201 direct that the riparian landowners bordering 
the water each own to “the middle of the lake or stream.”13 As such, the 
first step in determining ownership is establishing if the waterway is 
“navigable” for title purposes.   
 
III.  TESTS FOR NAVIGABILITY 
 
 Federal determination of “navigability” serves many different 
purposes.  The three most typical being: (1) to confer admiralty 
jurisdiction, 14  (2) to define Congress’s reach under the Commerce 
Clause, 15  and (3) to grant title under the Equal Footing Doctrine. 16  
Although the tests for navigability all stem from the same seminal cases, 
each purpose has developed a different progeny of cases that results in 
differences in application.  This is reiterated by the U.S. Supreme Court 
holding that:  
 
among the differences in application are the following.  
For state title under the equal-footing doctrine, 
navigability is determined at the time of statehood, and 
based on the ‘natural and ordinary condition’ of the 
water.  In contrast, admiralty jurisdiction extends to 
water routes made navigable even if not formerly so 
(artificial canal); and federal regulatory authority 
encompasses waters that only recently have become 
navigable, were once navigable but are no longer, or are 
not navigable and never have been but may become so 
by reasonable improvements.17   
 
                                                 
11. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 229 (1845). 
12.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201 (2015). 
13.  Andersen v. Monforton, 125 P.3d 614 (Mont. 2005). 
14.  The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 51 (1903).  
15. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404 
(1940); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
16. Alaska v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 1223, 1225 n.3 (D. Alaska 
1983); Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971). 
17.  PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 592 (2012) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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 A good example is Minnehaha Creek Watershed District v. 
Hoffman, where the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit held that a waterway was navigable in regards to title, but not 
navigable in regards to the Federal Rivers and Harbors Act. 18  
Furthermore, courts have more liberally construed the test when 
determining Congress’s reach under the Commerce Clause.19  Therefore, 
only cases that have determined navigability for title purposes under the 
Equal Footing Doctrine are included below and should be reviewed in 
determining title.20  
 Whether a waterway is navigable is a question of federal law.21  
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the “basis for the equal-footing 
doctrine, under which a state’s title to these lands was ‘conferred not by 
Congress but by the Constitution itself.’”22  The navigability test for title 
is set forth in The Daniel Ball, which holds that “[t]hose rivers must be 
regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact.  
And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of 
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce.”23   
 Furthermore, the test if a waterway is navigable is at the time of 
statehood. 24   Therefore, a Montana waterway is “navigable” for title 
purposes if on November 8, 1889 it was either (1) used as a highway for 
commerce, or (2) susceptible in its ordinary condition for being used as a 
highway for commerce.25  The State can establish title to the beds of 
active waterways by satisfying either condition.   
 The U.S. Supreme Court in Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. 
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. held that:  
 
the determination of the initial boundary between a 
riverbed, which the state acquired under the equal-
footing doctrine, and riparian fast lands likewise be 
decided as a matter of federal law rather than state law.26  
But that determination is solely for the purpose of fixing 
the boundaries of the riverbed acquired by the state at 
                                                 
18.  Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 627–
28 (8th Cir. 1979). 
19.  Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 724 (2006). 
20.  PPL Mont., 565 U.S. at 598. 
21.  United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55–56 (1926).   
22.  PPL Mont., 565 U.S. at 591 (quoting Or. ex rel. State Land Bd. v. 
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977)). 
23.  The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870). 
24. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935). 
25.  The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 557. 
26.   Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. at 376. 
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the time of its admission to the Union; thereafter the role 
of the equal-footing doctrine is ended, and the land is 
subject to the laws of the State.27 
 
In PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified this 
test by holding that a river or waterway will be looked at for navigability 
through a “segment-by-segment” approach.28  Therefore, depending on 
the waterway, the state may have only been granted portions with 
waterfalls, rapids, or other unique features that eliminate the 
susceptibility for use as a highway for commerce in 1889.  This has 
become important in recent years due to minerals located under certain 
river segments and also because of power generating facilities that have 
been constructed.29  Royalty and lease payments are often millions of 
dollars a year in revenue for states.30 
 In order to demonstrate that a waterway was susceptible for use 
as a highway for commerce, courts will look at what could have been 
“conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.” 31  
Furthermore, “a river need not be susceptible of navigation at every point 
during the year” but “neither can that susceptibility be so brief that it is 
not a commercial reality.”32  The navigability of a river is also unaffected 
by seasonal changes as the river need not “be open at all seasons of the 
year, or at all stages of the water.”33   And finally, portaging around 
obstructions such as waterfalls or rapids, where such portaging interferes 
with the river’s usefulness for trade and travel for commerce may defeat 
navigability for title purposes on that segment of river.34   
 
A. Steam Boat Test 
 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence of 
use by a steam boat in the transportation of goods and people is enough 
to establish a waterway as navigable.35  For example, in The Daniel Ball, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held a waterway to be navigable based on the 
                                                 
27.  Id. 
28. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 593 (2012). 
29.  Id. at 594–95.  
30.  Id. at 588. 
31.  Id. at 591–92.   
32.  Id. at 602–03.     
33.  Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 122 
(1921); see also Alaska v. United States, 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 83 (1931). 
34.  PPL Mont., 565 U.S at 598–99. 
35.  The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 564 (1870). 
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use by a steam boat that carried 123 tons of merchandise and passengers 
a distance of forty miles and was able to “draw only two feet of water.”36  
In this context, “draw” refers to “the depth of water necessary to operate 
the ship without grounding.”37  Therefore, the Court held that although 
there was only two feet of water, the presence of passengers and 
merchandise was enough to establish navigability.  This is reiterated in 
United States v. Utah, where the Court discussed extensively the use of 
boat trips and ferries as a basis for establishing navigability for title.38 
 
B.  Log Floating Test 
 
 In St. Anthony Falls Water-Power Co. v. Board of Water 
Commissioners of City of St. Paul, Minnesota, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that to be navigable “it is not necessary that it should be deep 
enough to admit the passage of boats at all portions of the stream.”39  In 
that case, the Court found a stretch of the Mississippi River navigable.  
Although not traversable by all boats, “it was always used for logs with 
shuts [sic]” and the rapids were used “for the purpose of running shallow 
boats and for floating logs.”40  Furthermore, the Court in United States v. 
State of Utah, used evidence that lumber and lumber rafts were 
transported along a section, as a basis for concluding that the stretch of 
river was navigable.41   
 The Montana Supreme Court has approved the log-floating test 
in Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, holding that 
“[n]avigability in fact under federal law can be determined by the log-
floating test.”42   In that case, the Montana Supreme Court found the 
Dearborn River to be navigable based on approximately 100,000 railroad 
ties that were floated down prior to statehood and about 700,000 board 
feet floated down just after statehood.43 
                                                 
36. Id. 
37.  The Dictionary of English Nautical Language Database: search 
results, SEA TALK NAUTICAL DICTIONARY (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.seatalk.info/ 
cgi-bin/nautical-marine-sailing-dictionary. 
38.  Utah, 283 U.S. at 82–83. 
39.  Saint Anthony Falls Water-Power Co. v. Bd. of Water Comm'rs of 
City of Saint Paul, Minn., 168 U.S. 349, 359 (1897). 
40.  Id. 
41.  Utah, 283 U.S. at 79.  
42.  Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 166 
(Mont. 1984). 
43.  Id. 
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 Among others, the log-floating test has been utilized to establish 
navigability for title by the Oregon Court of Appeals, 44  Michigan 
Supreme Court,45 the Washington Supreme Court,46 United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit,47 United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit,48 United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit,49 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.50  
 
C.  Recreational Use Test 
 
 Evidence of recreational use today may be relevant to establish 
that a waterway was navigable at the time of statehood.51  However, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that “[a]t a minimum . . . the party seeking to 
use present-day evidence for title purposes must show: (1) the watercraft 
are meaningfully similar to those in customary use for trade and travel at 
the time of statehood; and (2) the river’s poststatehood condition is not 
materially different from its physical condition at statehood.”52  
  For example in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power 
Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that “personal or private use by boats 
demonstrates the availability of the stream for the simpler types of 
commercial navigation.”53  Further, in Hardy v. State Land Board, the 
Oregon Court of Appeals reiterated that “recreational boating and fishing 
use on the upper portion of the river is properly considered under the 
federal ‘susceptibility’ test.”54 
                                                 
44.  Hardy v. State Land Bd., 360 P.3d 647, 661 (Or. Ct. App. 2015), 
review denied, 368 P.3d 25 (Or. 2016). 
45.   Rushton ex rel. Hoffmaster v. Taggart, 11 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Mich. 
1943). 
46. Monroe Mill Co. v. Menzel, 77 P. 813, 815 (Wash. 1904). 
47. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 557 F.2d 349, 
356 (2d Cir. 1977). 
48. Wisconsin v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 214 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1954). 
49. Mont. Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 185 F.2d 491, 494 (D.C. 
Cir. 1950). 
50. Or. By & Through Div. of State Lands v. Riverfront Prot. Ass’n, 
672 F.2d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1982); Conn. Light & Power Co., 557 F.2d 349; North 
Dakota v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1982). 
51.  PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 600–01 (2012). 
52. Id.  
53. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 416 
(1940); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931). 
54. Hardy v. State Land Bd., 360 P.3d 647, 660 (Or. Ct. App. 2015), 
review denied, 368 P.3d 25 (Or. 2016); see also Alaska v. United States, 662 F. 
Supp. 455, 468 (D. Alaska 1987), aff’d, Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401 (9th 
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D.  American Indians, Fur Traders, and Trappers 
 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has also discussed use by American 
Indians, fur traders, and trappers in determining if a waterway was 
navigable for title purposes.  In The Montello, the Court discussed the 
historical use of a waterway by American Indians,55  trappers, and fur 
traders.56  Another good example of this is Alaska v. United States, in 
which the United States District Court for the District of Alaska held a 
river to be navigable based largely on the historical use by Alaska 
Natives who traded fur on the waterway.57  
 
E.  Hydroelectric Generation Test 
 
 The hydroelectric generation test has not been utilized by the 
courts, but is the opinion of the author.  In recent years, multiple 
hydroelectric plants have been involved in litigation concerning the 
navigability of waterways.58  The navigability of a waterway often results 
in millions of dollars a year in lease payments to the state in which the 
dam is located.59  
 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that for title purposes 
“evidence must be confined to that which shows the river could sustain 
the kinds of commercial use that, as a realistic matter, might have 
occurred at the time of statehood.”60  The Court has also held that “the 
vital and essential point is whether the natural navigation of the river is 
such that it affords a channel for useful commerce.”61  Furthermore, the 
Court has held that “[e]vidence of present-day use may be considered to 
the extent it informs the historical determination whether the river 
                                                                                                             
Cir. 1989); S. Idaho Fish & Game Ass’n v. Picabo Livestock, 528 P.2d 1295 (Idaho 
1974); State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 336 N.E.2d 453, 475 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1975); Meunch v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952). 
55. The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 438 (1874).  
56. Id. at 432. 
57. Alaska, 662 F. Supp. at 467; see also Utah, 283 U.S. at 81 (Used by 
early explorers to establish a waterway’s navigability for title purposes.). 
58. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 600 (2012); 
Bingenheimer v. Diamond Iron Mining Co., 54 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. 1952); 
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 993 F.2d 1428 (9th 
Cir. 1993); FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 287 
F.3d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2002); City of Centralia, Wash. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 851 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1988). 
59. PPL Mont., 565 U.S. at 581. 
60. Id. at 600. 
61. Utah, 283 U.S. at 86. 
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segment was susceptible of use for commercial navigation at the time of 
statehood.”62  
 The generation and transition of electrical energy is undisputed 
commerce, which is one of the reasons title to the navigable waterways 
were granted to the States.  The Court has repeatedly held that “[t]here is 
no question that the interstate transmission of electric energy is subject to 
the commerce powers of Congress.”63  
 In 1886, approximately 45 hydroelectric power stations existed 
in the United States and Canada.64  By 1889, there were approximately 
200 hydroelectric power stations in the United States alone. 65  
Hydroelectric power generation was widely available and used when 
Montana became a state, and it is an undisputed type of commerce.66  If a 
hydroelectric power generation facility was built in a location, it is often 
the case that it could have been built in that location at statehood.  
Therefore, in the opinion of the author, a hydroelectric facility built on a 
section of river is prominent evidence that the portion of river was 
susceptible for commerce at statehood.  Since the flow of water 
necessary to produce hydroelectric power is the best evidence in and of 
itself to show navigability for title purposes. 
 
IV.  LAKES 
 
 Due to their inherent nature, lakes have developed a slightly 
different test for navigability than rivers.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
determined navigability by reviewing either whether the lake was 
connected by rivers such that it was “treated as a public highway”67 or if 
the lake itself was sufficient to support commerce.68 
                                                 
62. PPL Mont., 565 U.S. at 600. 
63. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 94 (1965). 
64. Nat’l Hydropower Ass’n, History of Hydro, HYDRO.ORG, 
http://www.hydro.org/tech-and-policy/history-of-hydro/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
65. Id. 
66.  Fed. Power Comm’n, 381 U.S. at 94. 
67. The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 441 (1874); see also State v. Adams, 89 
N.W.2d 661, 677 (Minn. 1957) (The lakes in question were nonnavigable because 
they had “not been used for commerce and do not provide practical routes for 
commerce, and no lake connects points between which they would be useful as a 
practical route for navigation.”); Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So. 2d 1140, 1151 (Miss. 1990) 
(A waterway is navigable based in part on fishing being conducted in the area and 
“streams, large lakes[,] and small lakes with outlets into other waters.”). 
68. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); see also Alaska v. 
United States, 563 F. Supp. 1223, 1226 (D. Alaska 1983), aff'd, 754 F.2d 851 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (Floatplanes to and from an isolated lake is insufficient to establish 
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V.  ISLANDS 
 
 The State of Montana holds title to all islands that emerged after 
statehood from below the low-water marks of a navigable waterway by 
vertical accretion.69  These islands are held for the financial benefit of the 
common public schools.70  This proposition is set forth in Montana Code 
Annotated § 70-18-203, requiring that “[i]slands and accumulations of 
land formed in the beds of streams which are navigable belong to the 
[S]tate.”71   
 Furthermore, the State continues to hold title to the islands, even 
if the landform later attaches to the bank.72  This is set forth is Montana 
Code Annotated § 77-1-102, which declares that “[t]he following lands 
belong to the [S]tate of Montana . . .  all lands that at any time in the past 
constituted an island or part of an island.”73  Furthermore, similar to 
riparian ownership, the State holds title to all accretions to the islands.74  
The Montana Supreme Court has established that the last medial line of 
water flowing between the island and the bank as the boundary for title 
purposes.75 
 In contrast, islands that have formed by vertical accretion in 
navigable waterways prior to statehood are held by the federal 
government.76  The U.S. Supreme Court in Texas v. Louisiana, held that: 
 
[i]t is the unquestioned rule that States entering the 
Union acquire title to the lands under navigable streams 
and other navigable waters within their borders.  But the 
rule does not reach islands or fast lands located within 
                                                                                                             
navigability for title.); Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1935) (Lake was unnavigable since it was “not wide enough or long 
enough to provide a practical route for the transportation of commodities in any 
direction and does not connect any points between which it would be useful as a 
practical route for navigation.”).  
69.  MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-18-203, 77-1-102 (2015); Edwards v. 
Severin, 785 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Mont. 1990); Mont. Dep’t of Natural Res. & 
Conservation v. Abbco Invs., LLC, 285 P.3d 532, 536 (Mont. 2012). 
70.  Abbco, 285 P.3d at 536. 
71.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-18-203. 
72.  Id. § 77-1-102. 
73.  Id.; see also Edwards, 785 P.2d at 1024 (holding that title remains 
with the State although an island is “no longer surrounded entirely by water”). 
74.  Mont. Dep’t of State Lands v. Armstrong, 824 P.2d 255 (Mont. 
1992). 
75.  Id. 
76.  Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702, 713 (1973). 
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such waters.  Title to islands remains in the United 
States, unless expressly granted along with the stream 
bed or otherwise.77   
 
VI.  THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
THE MONTANA STATE LANDS 
 
 The Montana Constitution granted the Board of Land 
Commissioners the authority to manage and administer submerged lands 
of the State.78   By statute, the Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation (“DNRC”) manages and administers the lands under the 
direction and guidance of the Board of Land Commissioners. 79   The 
Montana Legislature and the Montana Constitution require that the 
Board of Land Commissioners, by and through the DNRC, “take all 
proper proceedings for the purpose of determining the title to the beds of 
lakes and other bodies of water.”80 
 The State of Montana holds title to all real property located 
between the low-water mark of navigable waterways in trust for the 
public.81  However, islands that have emerged from between the low-
water marks after statehood by vertical accretion within navigable 
waterways are held in trust for the financial benefit of the common 
public schools.82    
 The seminal case establishing and discussing the public trust 
doctrine is Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, which held that the 
title to navigable waterways is “held in trust for the people of the state, 
that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce 
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction 
or interference of private parties.”83   
 Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, “the State’s title to the 
riverbed vests absolutely as of the time of its admission and is not subject 
                                                 
77.  Id. (internal citations omitted); United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 
1314, 1319 (9th Cir. 1997). 
78. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 11. 
79. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-1-301 (2015). 
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-1-105; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 11. 
81. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 11; MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-1-102; see also 
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 212 (1845); see also Mont. Dep’t of Natural Res. & 
Conservation v. Abbco Invs., LLC, 285 P.3d 532, 536 (Mont. 2012) (holding that 
the low-water mark is that which is covered by the lowest tenth percentile of water 
flow). 
82. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 77-1-102(1), 70-18-203; Abbco, 285 P.3d at 
536; Edwards v. Severin, 785 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Mont. 1990). 
83. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
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to later defeasance by operation of any doctrine of federal common 
law.”84   When states are vested with title through the Equal Footing 
Doctrine, title to the beds of navigable waterways are subject to state law 
including the Public Trust Doctrine.85   
 The Montana Supreme Court explained this distinction in 
Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation v. Abbco 
Investments, LLC, holding that:  
 
[w]hile equal footing cases have noted that the State 
takes title to the navigable waters and their beds in trust 
for the public, the contours of that public trust do not 
depend upon the [United States] Constitution. Under 
accepted principles of federalism, the States retain 
residual power to determine the scope of the public trust 
over waters within their borders, while federal law 
determines riverbed title under the equal-footing 
doctrine [at the time of statehood].86   
 
Therefore “[o]nce the State obtains sovereignty over navigable riverbeds, 
the United States has ceded all its title and thus the public trust doctrine 
governing the State’s disposition of such lands ‘remains a matter of state 
law.’”87 
 The public trust doctrine is codified at Montana Code Annotated 
§ 77-1-102 and declares that the “State-owned riverbeds are public lands 
of the [S]tate that are held in trust for the people as provided in Article X, 
section 11, of the Montana [C]onstitution.”88  Under the Public Trust 
Doctrine, the State is required to retain ownership and generally may not 
convey title to private individuals.89   
 In Curran, the Montana Supreme Court held that “the State can 
no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are 
                                                 
84. Abbco, 285 P.3d at 536 (quoting Or. ex rel. State Land Bd. v. 
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370–371 (1977)). 
85. Id.; PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603-04 (2012). 
86. Abbco, 285 P.3d at 536 (discussing PPL Mont., LLC v. State, 229 
P.3d 421, 450-451, rev’d, 565 U.S. 576 (2012) (internal citation omitted)); United 
States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. at 
376; Federal Submerged Land Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 31, § 3, 67 Stat. 30 (codified 
at 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012)). 
87. Juliana v. United States, 6:15-CV-1517, 2016 WL 1442435, at *10–
11 (D. Or. Apr. 8, 2016) (quoting PPL Mont., 565 U.S. at 603). 
88. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-1-102 (2015). 
89. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 157–
68 (Mont. 1984). 
BUTLER PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/24/2017 4:25 AM 
 
 





interested, like navigable waterways and the soils under them, so as to 
leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties.” 90  
Specific exceptions are carved out for improvements used for navigation, 
such as wharves or piers, or when a parcel may be disposed of “without 
impairment of the public interest in what remains.”91   Therefore, the 
active beds of all navigable waterways are “public lands of the state that 
are held in trust for the people.”92  The Montana Legislature has directed 
that income derived from the use of these beds are deposited in the State 
School Facility and Technology Account.93   
 However, islands that emerge from between the low-water marks 
after statehood by vertical accretion within navigable waterways are held 
in trust for the financial benefit of the common public schools.94  This 
idea is set forth in Montana Code Annotated § 77-1-102(1), which 
declares that “[t]he following lands belong to the [S]tate of Montana to 
be held in trust for the benefit of the public schools of the [S]tate . . . all 
islands existing in the navigable streams or lakes in this [S]tate.”95  The 
Montana Supreme Court has reiterated this in Abbco, holding that the 
“islands in question belong to the State to be held in trust for the benefit 
of the public schools of the state.” 96   However, as the authority 
determining title to islands is statutory and not constitutional this allows 
the legislature to impose certain restrictions that would be 
unconstitutional if imposed on other Trust lands.97  
 Lands held by the State for the benefit of the common public 
schools are trust lands. 98   Acting on behalf of the Board of Land 
Commissioners, the DNRC has a constitutional and fiduciary duty to 
“secure the largest measure of legitimate and reasonable advantage to the 
[S]tate” with regard “for the long-term financial support of education.”99  
Furthermore, in regard to the trust lands, the State holds these lands for 
                                                 
90. Id. at 168 (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 
(1892)).  
91. Id. 
92. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-1-102(3); see also PPL Montana, LLC, 355 
Mont. at 444, cert. granted in part, 131 U.S. 3019 (2011), rev'd and remanded on 
other grounds, 132 U.S. 1215 (2012).   
93. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 77-1-103(4), 17-3-1003(5), 20-9-516(2)(b). 
94. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 77-1-102(1), 70-18-203; Mont. Dep’t of 
Natural Res. & Conservation v. Abbco Invs., LLC, 285 P.3d 532, 536 (Mont. 2012); 
Edwards v. Severin, 785 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Mont. 1990). 
95. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-1-102(1). 
96. Abbco, 285 P.3d at 536 (internal citations omitted). 
97. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-1-405. 
98.  Id. § 77-1-101(9). 
99. Id. § 77-1-202. 
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the financial benefit of the State schools.100  Courts have held that for the 
school trust lands the “beneficiaries do not include the general public, 
other governmental institutions, nor the general welfare of this state.  
Congress did not intend that the lands granted and confirmed should 
collectively constitute a general resource or asset like ordinary public 
lands held broadly in trust for the people.”101 
 
VII.  RIPARIAN BOUNDARY FOR TITLE PURPOSES 
 
 At statehood, Congress granted to the states title to the active 
beds of navigable waters within their boundaries under the Equal Footing 
Doctrine.102 Congress granted each state title to the navigable waterways 
up to the high water mark.103  
 In Gibson v. Kelly, the Montana Supreme Court held that the 
riparian land owners own the surface to the low-water mark, subject to 
certain limitations. 104   This has been codified at Montana Code 
Annotated § 70-16-201.105  However, the State of Montana has retained 
an easement for the public use between the low-water mark and the high-
water mark of navigable waterways.106  This is commonly referred to as 
the “angler’s easement.” 
 The distinction is discussed in Curran, holding that:  
 
[w]hile section 70–16–201, MCA, provides for private 
ownership of the adjacent lands to the low-water mark, 
the “angling statute,” section 87–2–305, MCA, 
recognizes a public right to access for fishing purposes 
to the high water mark.  Further, in Gibson v. Kelly . . .  
this Court recognized a public right to access for fishing 
and navigational purposes to the point of the high water 
mark.  Therefore, we hold that the public has a right to 
                                                 
100. Id. 
101. Kanaly v. State By & Through Janklow, 368 N.W.2d 819, 824 (S.D. 
1985) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting partially United States v. Ervien, 246 F. 
277, 280 (8th Cir. 1917), aff'd, 251 U.S. 41 (1919)). 
102. Mont. Dep't of Natural Res. & Conservation v. Abbco Invs., LLC, 
285 P.3d 532, 536 (Mont. 2012). 
103. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 725 (2006); 33 C.F.R. § 
328.3 (2016); United States v. Gossett, 277 F. Supp. 11 (C.D. Cal. 1967); 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1301 (2012). 
104. Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517, 520 (Mont. 1895); see also Herrin v. 
Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 330 (Mont. 1925). 
105.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201. 
106.  Id. § 87-2-305. 
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use the state-owned waters to the point of the high water 
mark except to the extent of barriers in the waters.  In 
case of barriers, the public is allowed to portage around 
such barriers in the least intrusive way possible, 
avoiding damage to the private property holder’s 
rights.107   
 
As set forth above, the riparian owner does not have an unencumbered 
fee simple ownership of the surface rights between the low-water mark 
and the high-water mark.  Furthermore, the mineral ownership between 
the low-water mark and the high-water mark has not been litigated in 
Montana.   
 Recently, in Reep v. State, the North Dakota Supreme Court held 
that under a statute similar to Montana’s statute, the State owns the 
minerals up to the high water mark based on the North Dakota’s 
constitutional anti-gifting clause.108  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that:  
 
[b]efore North Dakota was admitted to the Union, the 
United States held the beds of navigable waters in the 
Dakota Territory from high watermark to high 
watermark in trust for the future [S]tate.  Upon 
admission to the Union, North Dakota was entitled to 
sovereign ownership of the beds of navigable waters 
from high watermark to high watermark under the equal 
footing doctrine.  Upon entering the Union on equal 
footing with the established States, the ‘rights of riparian 
or littoral proprietors in the soil below high water mark 
of navigable waters [were] governed by the local laws.’  
Under those principles, North Dakota could ‘resign to 
the riparian proprietor rights which properly belong to 
[it] in [its] sovereign capacity,’ and was free to allocate 
property interests in the beds of navigable waters below 
the ordinary high watermark.  However, North Dakota 
could not totally abdicate its interest to private parties 
because it held that interest, by virtue of its sovereignty, 
in trust for the public.109 
                                                 
107.  Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 
1984).   
108.  Reep v. State, 841 N.W.2d 664, 667 (N.D. 2013). 
109.  Id. at 669–70 (quoting State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 
N.W.2d 537, 542 (N.D. 1994) (internal citations omitted)). 
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The North Dakota Supreme Court went on to distinguish previous 
holdings and statutes by holding that “[t]hose cases and authorities from 
other low-watermark states do not control the issue about ownership of 
mineral interests in the shore zone in North Dakota because they do not 
involve an analysis under an anti-gift clause like N.D. Const. [A]rt. X, § 
18.”110 
 Similar to the North Dakota’s constitutional anti-gift clause the 
Montana Constitution demands that “[n]o such land or any estate or 
interest therein shall ever be disposed of . . . until the full market value of 
the estate or interest disposed of . . . has been paid or safely secured to 
the [S]tate.”111  Furthermore, the 1889 Montana Constitution has almost 
identical language as North Dakota’s Supreme Court quoted as the anti-
gifting provision.112  However, as of the date of this publication, this 
issue has not been brought before the Montana Supreme Court. 
 
VIII.  ACCRETION, EROSION, AND AVULSION 
 
  Riparian land owners lose land through the natural process of 
erosion and gain land through accretion.113  Accretion and erosion are 
generally defined when a river “gradually and imperceptibly changes its 
course over a period of time, resulting in sedimentary deposits on one 
bank along the water line.” 114   A river that changes course by 
imperceptible degrees, or a grain by grain movement of particles, is 
described as erosion or accretion.115  Erosion removes all remnants of the 
former landform, whereas accretion results in a completely new 
landform.  In Harding v. Savoy, the Montana Supreme Court held that 
“the property boundary shifts with the water line.”116  
  Although the riparian landowners may gain or lose land through 
accretion and erosion, the State of Montana at all times continues to hold 
title to the active riverbeds of navigable rivers despite river movement, 
including the minerals thereunder.117  In Jackson v. Burlington Northern 
                                                 
110.  Id. at 675. 
111.  MONT. CONST. art. X, § 11; MONT. CONST. of 1889 art. XVII, § 1. 
112.  Compare MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XIII, § I, with N.D. CONST. 
art. X, § 18. 
113.  Harding v. Savoy, 100 P.3d 976, 985 (Mont. 2004). 
114.  Id. 
115.  Jackson v. Burlington N. Inc., 667 P.2d 406, 407 (Mont. 1983). 
116.  Id. 
117.  MONT. CONST. art. X, § 11; MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-18-201 (2015); 
Jackson, 667 P.2d 406; see generally Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
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Inc., the Montana Supreme Court specifically held that even severed 
mineral estates are subject to the doctrine of accretion and erosion and 
that the current location and acreage of the active riverbed controls.118   
 Avulsion, on the other hand, generally occurs “when a river 
suddenly changes its channel to form a new one.” 119   Accretion and 
erosion result in a change in ownership, avulsion generally does not.120 
Title to real property does not change if the parcel remains “identifiable” 
before and after an avulsive event.121  With avulsion, remnants of the old 
landform are distinct and identifiable before and after the event occurs. 
Without evidence to the contrary, courts have held that “it is presumed 
that changes in river banks are due to accretion rather than avulsion.”122   
 The correct inquiry is not the rate of change, but the process by 
which the change occurred.123  Although the location of the river may 
change, the riparian land owners gain land by accretion and lose land by 
erosion.124  No “abandoned channel” exists as the river moved over time.  
However, if a river has changed locations by a sudden and violent 
process and establishes a new channel, this is described as avulsion.125  
An avulsive event will create an abandoned channel.126  This “abandoned 
channel,” often described as the “old channel” no longer lies under the 
active river bed.   
  Generally, the State of Montana holds title to the abandoned 
channels of navigable rivers located within the United States surveyed 
meandered lines where the avulsive event occurred between February 19, 
1937 (the date of enactment of Montana Code Annotated § 77-1-102) 
and April 14, 2013 (when it was repealed).  For an avulsive event that 
causes an abandoned channel after April 15, 2013, Montana Code 
Annotated § 77-18-206 sets forth the process in which the riparian land 
owners may claim the newly formed abandoned channel.   
 
 
                                                 
118.  Jackson, 667 P.2d at 409. 
119.  Harding, 100 P.3d at 985. 
120.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-18-206; Harding, 100 P.3d at 985; 
McCafferty v. Young, 397 P.2d 96, 99 (Mont. 1964). 
121.  Mont. Dep’t of State Lands v. Armstrong, 824 P.2d 255, 257 (Mont. 
1992); McCafferty, 397 P.2d at 99. 
122.  McCafferty, 397 P.2d at 99. 
123.  See, e.g., id. at 96; Mont. Dep’t of State Lands, 824 P.2d 255. 
124.  McCafferty, 397 P.2d at 99; Mont. Dep’t of State Lands, 824 P.2d at 
258-59. 
125.  McCafferty, 397 P.2d at 99. 
126.  Id. 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
  
 It is essential to determine the exact location of property 
boundaries. However, due to the ephemeral nature of riparian 
boundaries, an additional body of law has developed specific to riparian 
rights. In this context, Montana’s water boundaries, are influenced by the 
Equal Footing Doctrine and Navigability Tests: steam boat, log floating, 
recreational use, use by American Indians, fur trappers, and traders, and 
hydroelectric generation. Additionally, lakes and islands encompass their 
own rules. Deeper reflection on these boundary issues allows for future 
clarity in protecting Montana’s public trust lands and defining the ever 
changing riparian boundaries in Montana. 
